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Introduction
U.S. foreign policy toward Iran focuses on a dual-track approach, engaging in diplomacy and leveraging economic sanctions. Despite more than 30 years of pursuing this approach, the U.S. has failed to lessen Iran's threat to regional and international stability. Iran continues to pursue and come ever-closer to establishing nuclear capability. This historical approach has only proven to be a mild distraction to Iran's goal. The U.S. should pursue an aggressive third approach -establishing red lines backed a credible and sustained threat of military action.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton refers to the current U.S. approach as moving simultaneously on the "dual track" of diplomacy and sanctions. 1 However, according to the 2010 National Military Strategy, military power and America's other instruments of statecraft are "more effective when applied in concert." 2 Instruments of statecraft or "power" refer to the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational means used to achieve national military objectives -yet, efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities have not benefitted from the use of all of these instruments. Thus, U.S.
policy undervalues the military instrument in changing Tehran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, support to terrorism, and threats against its neighbors.
Although U.S. administration officials continue to state "all options" are on the table, Iran seemingly continues to hedge its bet that the military instrument will not be used against them in a lethal capacity. Prudently implemented, the military instrument provides a degree of influence needed to strengthen diplomatic and economic pressure against Iran. A more effective option then is a complete strategy integrating political, economic, and military elements and seeing the matter through to a defined and achievable end. 3 Combined with his description of red lines, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta supports this approach saying, "I continue to believe that pressure -economic pressure, diplomatic pressure -and strengthened collective defenses are the right approach." 4 Properly applied, the integration of the military instrument now could save the U.S. from a much larger investment of U.S. military power later.
Historic Failures of the Dual Track Approach
The historic track record of engagement between the U.S. and Iran does not Changing Iran's behavior through diplomatic efforts has proven to be a serious challenge. As a result, Iran sees their continued intransigence as eventually producing the outcomes they most desire; possession of nuclear capabilities and regional hegemony. Nonetheless, Iran's negative behavior denies them the credibility needed to leverage diplomacy as a means to reach agreeable solutions. The recent foiled assassination attempt on the Saudi ambassador to the United States, threats to close the Strait of Hormuz, clandestine operations of nuclear facilities, and the detention of a U.S. citizen whom Iran claims to be a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) spy are the latest acts and negative behavior that serve as barriers to diplomatic progress.
Compounding the problem, Iran's suspicion of the U.S., its own perceived position of strength, and its perception that U.S. power is in decline, makes it increasingly difficult for Tehran to agree to offers of diplomacy. Changing these behaviors will require more than diplomatic rhetoric or economic pressure to which Iran has proven effective at absorbing. 
Reluctance to Use Military Instrument
Fear of high cost, miscalculation, and jeopardizing U.S. -allied cooperation are top reasons why the use of the military instrument is viewed as an unfavorable option.
The high cost in lives and resources make use of the military instrument against Iran unappealing. Jeffrey White, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute asserts, "we are talking here about war, with attendant potential high costs to all combatants in terms of military casualties, civilian damage, and economic disruption. 10 In a time of fiscal austerity, military operations in the Middle East are the last desire of the American public.
The danger of being drawn into direct conflict with Iran due to miscalculation weighs heavily on U.S. approaches towards Iran. Joint Chiefs Chairman, General
Martin Dempsey, echoes similar sentiments in stating: "My biggest worry is they'll miscalculate our resolve. Any miscalculation could mean that we're drawn into conflict.
And … that would be a tragedy for the region and the world. 11 The potential of miscalculating poses significant challenges to U.S. policy, therefore the military instrument is exclusively viewed as a last resort option when it is considered.
Fears of jeopardizing international cooperation also play a critical role in U.S. Many experts agree that Iran's core national security goals are "to protect itself from foreign, primarily U.S., interference or attack" that could unseat the regime. The IRCG is linked to multiple facets of protecting the regime. The IRGC is charged with defense of the regime and the country. 15 As examples, the IRGC oversees a robust apparatus of media resources, training activities, education programs designed to bolster loyalty to the regime, prepare the citizenry for homeland defense. 16 In addition, Patrick Clawson asserts that "the IRGC has become even more powerful, to the point that the regime's survival and perhaps control are in its hands." Iran is apt to hedge on the assumption that their oil infrastructure is safe due to the importance and impact of Iranian oil to the global economy -but must be convinced It is only through a comprehensive and robust three-pronged strategy of diplomacy, sanctions, and the credible threat of military force that the United States can hope to compel Iran to negotiate in earnest over its nuclear program. 21 As reinforcement of this idea, Ambassador and former Middle East special assistant to the Obama administration Dennis Ross asserts, "Diplomacy backed by coercion has always been a part of diplomacy done well." 22 To be effective, coercive diplomacy requires the backing of a credible threat. To be credible, the military capability and capacity must reflect the political intent. It is only through this connection that a "three-pronged" policy approach will work.
The January 2012 Department of Defense strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21 st Century Defense, outlines the necessary framework to make such a "three-pronged" approach reality. The guidance states, "U.S.
policy will emphasize Gulf security, in collaboration with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries when appropriate, to prevent Iran's development of a nuclear weapon capability and counter its destabilizing policies." 23 It goes on to state that, "whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory To increase U.S. "believability," definitive actions such as force posture adjustments, military exercises, and declaratory statements must be used in a concomitant fashion. To increase threat credibility and prove U.S. resolve among allies in the region, the military instrument must be used to shape ally and adversary perceptions and behavior.
Military shaping operations are conducted primarily to shape perceptions and influence adversaries and allies behavior. 27 Shaping is not an effort to deter, but a way to set conditions in the event deterrence is required or a crisis escalates.
Recommendations
The 2012 Third, and most importantly, the establishment of a red line would be necessary to illustrate the willingness to use force versus allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.
Encouraging Regional Collaboration: Joint Exercises
The GCC's capacity and collective willingness to overtly leverage existing technology and exploit Iranian vulnerabilities, lends credibility to the overall threats against Iran. The utility of approaches such as joint and multilateral exercises would have great effect in increasing GCC capacity to negate threats posed by Iran.
In addition, they allow the U.S. to leverage the GCC's ability to "share the costs and responsibilities of global leadership" by building GCC confidence in their capability and capacity to defend themselves against Iran. 28 Exercises allow the U.S. and GCC partners to exploit "our technological, joint, and networked advantage. The proximity of a threat to an adversary tends to have a profound effect on that adversaries decision calculus. Ross and Makovsky assert, "the prospect that Iran would face increased pre-emptive and retaliatory capabilities nearby" would give them reason to "consider the efficacy of their moves." 33 Similarly, Secretary Clinton alludes to the psychological effect of U.S. presence in the region stating that Iran "would be badly miscalculating if they did not look at the entire region and all of our presence in many countries in the region." 34 However, maintaining the conditions to retain a mixture of permanent and rotational capabilities in the Middle East could be an issue. Vali Nasir confirms that "Muslim public opinion is the achilles heel of U.S. alliances with Muslim-majority states." 35 This opinion is even more pronounced with regard to U.S. presence in the region. To prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear capabilities requires Gulf governments continued support of U.S. presence in the region. When asked "How much, if at all, do you think U.S. bases in the Middle East are a threat to Iran", a majority of Iranian respondents saw U.S. bases as a major threat. 36 A robust permanent presence is not required, but retention and ability to improve current facilities is essential to success.
U.S. capabilities, in conjunction with GCC militaries, must reflect an ability to deal with multiple contingencies and threats in a swift and decisive manner. The current capability footprint is sufficient to deal a significant blow to Iran's military capabilities, communication infrastructure, and known nuclear facilities. However, capabilities focused specifically on Iran must have a better unity of effort, ability to partner and advise GCC militaries, and augment GCC capability gaps in order to underscore credibility of U.S. threats.
In addition, Iran's reliance on human intelligence and covert operations is a critical vulnerability that is susceptible to direct and indirect influence. 37 Second, establishing red lines is the lesser of two evils considering the alternative of a nuclear capable Iran and a Middle East nuclear arms race. The consequences of an emboldened Iran and U.S. allies seeking nuclear capabilities as a means of self-protection will become a reality as opposed to a distant fear. Vali Nasr asserts that the GCC states would opt to pursue "indigenous nuclear programs" if faced with negative perceptions regarding the U.S. ability to honor security guarantees. 41 To this end, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan and Egypt have all expressed interest in nuclear technology. 42 Not only does establishing red lines assure U.S. allies in the region, it also obligates those allies to accept the inherent risks of the red lines. As the lesser of two evils, mitigating the risks of red lines should be more acceptable than risk mitigation for a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.
Last, establishing red lines is a way to reduce ambiguity associated with U.S.
intentions in the Middle East. Red-line proponents assert that these thresholds can decrease the ambiguity of U.S. policies. 43 Ambiguity is reduced by identifying a vital adversary action that once violated, will result in military retaliation. In this sense, every action cannot be deemed vital based on the cost and consequences of retaliation. To decrease the ambiguity, red lines must be enforced and unambiguously defined.
A red line must be a single trigger mechanism, and not a series of triggers commonly referred to as "pink lines. 47 Due to the effect that this would have on the global economy, international pressure would probably prevent this from occurring and therefore eliminating the need for the U.S. to add this to a running "series" of red lines.
A red line must be broadly defined with narrowly scoped metrics. Defining a red line precisely makes the line unambiguous. Clear metrics confirm or deny the necessity to retaliate. If a red line is defined too narrowly or as a "series," it could lead Iranians to assume "we can do everything up to that red line" with impunity. 48 
Conclusion
The optimal solution to breaking the nuclear impasse with Iran is diplomacy.
However, preventing Iran from proceeding with their nuclear ambitions cannot be left to a "dual track" of economic sanctions and dormant diplomacy. Iran's dual track approach of offering talks while continuing to build nuclear capabilities has arguably proven more effective than the U.S. dual track. Trading space for time has enabled Iran, albeit slowly, to move dangerously close to achieving their nuclear ambitions.
To consider sanctions and dormant diplomacy a dual track approach with regard to Iran is close to conceding to failure. Additionally, the U.S. is limiting "all options" by undervaluing the military instrument. In order to affect or change Iran's behavior, all instruments of national power must be used in coordination. Unless the military instrument is better integrated into U.S. policy to change Iran's behavior, the reality of a nuclear armed Iran will occur sooner rather than later.
The consequences of a nuclear capable Iran and GCC states likely to acquire their own nuclear security blankets present a much greater threat to the world. The cost of managing the risk of potential escalation with Iran outweighs the cost of a world with a Middle East nuclear arms race.
Integration of the military instrument to shape Iran's behavior and influence their actions is essential to bolster U.S. policy in the region. Building GCC military capacity through combined and multilateral exercises, tailoring the force posture of U.S.
capabilities in the region, and emphasizing the intent to protect U.S. vital interest through red lines is essential to changing Iran's behavior.
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